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 Avoidable and unavoidable mistakes in child protection work 
 
 Eileen Munro 
 
Summary: 
 
This article argues that social workers and the general public need a clear understanding of 
the distinction between avoidable and unavoidable mistakes in child protection work. The 
public is understandably distressed when a child dies and is right to demand an inquiry to 
check the quality of help provided. But a child's death is not proof that any professional was 
incompetent. Our limited knowledge and the complexity of assessing risk mean that 
professionals can only make the best judgement on the available evidence. Analysis of 45 
inquiry reports shows that inquiries appreciate this; in 42% of them social workers were not 
criticised. The analysis however also reveals one persistent error: social workers are slow to 
revise their judgements. Psychology research indicates that this error is widespread and by no 
means peculiar to social workers but it means that misjudgements about clients that may have 
been unavoidable on the limited knowledge available when they were made continue to be 
accepted despite a growing body of evidence against them. Social workers need a greater 
acceptance of their fallibility and a willingness to consider that their judgements and 
decisions are wrong. To change your mind in the light of new information is a sign of good 
practice, a sign of strength not weakness. 
 
 In child protection work, it is every social worker's nightmare to make a mistake that 
contributes to the death of a child. But some mistakes are inevitable because of the 
complexity of the work and our level of knowledge. Ideally, social workers should protect all 
children who are at risk of abuse while not disrupting any family providing adequate care. 
Abused children should return only to families who have changed and no longer pose a threat 
to their offspring. These ideals however are impossible to achieve. Our understanding of 
human nature in general and of child abusers in particular mean that we are always making 
decisions based on imperfect knowledge. Predicting which children will be safe and which at 
risk is an uncertain business. We can only aim to reach the decision that is 'best' according to 
our current general knowledge and understanding of the particular case. This will not always 
be right in the sense of turning out to be the correct prediction. Sometimes children will be 
left with parents who abuse them.  Sometimes they will return to parents who, despite 
apparent improvement, continue to harm them. Some judgements will be 'false positives', i.e. 
the children are deemed at risk and taken into care though they might have been left safely 
with their parents. 
 The inevitability of some mistakes in this type of work has been overshadowed by 
cases where the errors seemed avoidable. Society's horror and outrage at some well-
publicised cases where children endured terrible abuse before being killed has fuelled a 
public expectation that social workers should be able to protect children and, if a child dies 
from abuse, social workers have done something wrong. The problem for social workers is 
how to distinguish between good and bad mistakes. Which errors of judgement are due to our 
limited knowledge and which to inadequate investigation and woolly thinking? 
 The issue is important because social workers need, for their own peace of mind, to 
have realistic, achievable standards of good practice. And also, I shall argue, they need to 
 
 
work in a culture that recognises that good practitioners make mistakes, that new facts or 
ideas make them review and often revise their judgements, and that acknowledging such 
errors is a sign of strength not of weakness.   
 I start by examining the complexity of making judgements in child protection work, 
highlighting their tentative nature and the inevitability of some degree of error. Analysis of 
the many public inquiries into child abuse tragedies reveals that inquiries understand the 
distinction between reasonable misjudgements and errors that deserve to be censured. 
However closer study of these reports shows how resistant social workers are to changing 
their minds and how powerful an influence this has on the conduct of a case. This reluctance 
to abandon beliefs should not be seen as a particular fault of social workers  but as a general 
weakness of intuitive reasoning. A large body of research in psychology suggests that 
people's beliefs 'are remarkably resilient in the face of empirical challenges that seem 
logically devastating' (Kahneman, 1990, p.144). However, while mistakes due to our limited 
knowledge are unavoidable, the errors arising from the biasses inherent in intuitive reasoning 
can be reduced by social workers' adopting a more critical approach to their judgements.  
 
The jigsaw puzzle of assessment  
 
 Child abuse can rarely be decisively established or dismissed on the basis of one item 
of information. Even serious physical injuries, though arousing strong suspicion, may be due 
to accident or illness, or there may be dispute about the perpetrator. Identifying child abuse 
and assessing risk are more akin to making up a jigsaw puzzle than to any simple process of 
observation. Social workers need to gather together  the little bits of information known to 
relatives, neighbours, and professionals. They then have to try to fit the pieces together to 
arrive at a picture of the family. The task is far more complex than a typical jigsaw puzzle 
game. Social workers do not know in advance what the underlying picture is; they do not 
know if they have got all the pieces; and they are not sure if a particular piece belongs to this 
picture. To add to the complexity, they cannot be certain of the shape and colour of each 
piece: these are not made up of 'hard facts' but of information of varying degrees of 
reliability. Sometimes, we are uncertain whether the 'fact' is true or false. Imagine the 
difficulty of trying to make a jigsaw when we do not know if a particular piece is black or 
white or possibly some shade of grey.  
 Despite the limited knowledge base, social workers have to make decisions and act. 
They have to guess at the underlying picture and make judgements about the safety of the 
children involved. The reality of their statutory responsibilities means they are not allowed 
the luxury of unlimited time and resources to investigate and reflect. The 'dilemma of 
liberalism', as Dingwall (1983, p.220) calls it, is that society wants children protected from 
parental abuse while keeping the family as a bastion of liberty. The law therefore gives social 
workers only limited powers of investigation. The need for speed is another constraint. A 
quick response is desirable, particularly in deciding whether the child may be at such grave 
risk that urgent action is needed to protect them. Swift assessments also seem a common 
aspect of human nature. Within a short time of meeting someone, we all form intuitive 
judgements about them. Social workers following up a child abuse allegation will quickly 
form an opinion, a 'gut reaction', about the parents. It is therefore both necessary and 
inevitable that initial assessments and judgements will be based on very limited evidence 
about the family. 
 Judgements made on such slender grounds should, rationally, be regarded as very 
tentative and open to revision. Consider how many sources of new information or ideas there 
 
 
are to challenge them. 
 First, checks on the accuracy of the initial information may disprove or cast strong 
doubt on some parts of it. Child abuse is an emotive area notorious for the unreliability of 
people's assertions. Neighbours and relatives may make false or exaggerated allegations from 
malice or as part of a quarrel. Parents accused of abusing their children have good reason to 
lie if the claim is true. Children often find it hard to tell outsiders the truth about being abused 
and so may confirm their parents' false explanations of their injuries. The social worker may 
have made swift judgements about the honesty of the various people involved but these can 
and should be checked later in a more detailed investigation.  
 Secondly, later investigation may produce more pieces of the jigsaw puzzle. When the 
procedures are followed and checks made with other agencies, the police, for instance, may 
provide details of a violent criminal record or the health visitor may report previous injuries 
that made her slightly worried. 
 A third source of causes for revision comes from reflecting upon how the pieces fit 
together. With time, emotional distance from the family, and help from a supervisor, social 
workers can consider new ways of putting the pieces together and sometimes this produces a 
radically different picture. During an interview, a social worker might find parents' anger at 
being accused of abusing their child a reasonable response from an innocent couple. In 
supervision, however, it might be suggested that they had used anger to control the direction 
of the interview and distract the social worker away from important issues. 
 In the difficult area of child protection work, social workers are fallible. They cannot 
make the 'right' decision in any absolute sense. Judgements and decisions can only be the 
'best' on the available evidence. As the case progresses and new information and ideas are 
received, judgements have to be reviewed and sometimes changed. Social workers therefore 
often have to recognise their former views were wrong - although reasonable at the time they 
were made. In this sense, 'mistakes' are an inevitable part of practice and recognising them is 
an essential element of good practice. 
 
Inquiry reports 
 
 A study of inquiry reports shows how they have different standards than the public 
and do not expect social workers to be infallible. When Liam Johnson died there was 
widespread outrage and a Member of Parliament demanded a public inquiry, asserting that 
'something went very wrong'. The inquiry report however firmly rejects this and states that 
the death was unpredictable and that 'nothing went wrong' (London Borough of Islington, 
1989).  Analysis of the  reports shows interesting differences between cases that were 
censured and those where social workers were not blamed for the tragedy. 
 As part of a study funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, I have 
examined 45 publicly available reports of inquiries into child abuse deaths, from the Graham 
Bagnall report of 1973 (Salop County Council, 1973) to the recent Leanne White report 
(Nottinghamshire, 1994). The inquiries aim to examine what happened and see if there are 
lessons for professionals to learn from the tragedy. This inevitably involves making 
judgements about the competence of the workers involved. This has to be done in the context 
of the policies and practice of the time. A social worker's or doctor's actions might be deemed 
reasonable practice by the standards of that time but the inquiry recommends changing 
procedures so that future workers should avoid similar conduct. Therefore actions that are 
criticised in later reports might not have been censured in earlier ones.  
 Some reports have a straightforward judgemental statement - Jasmine Beckford's 
 
 
death 'was both a predictable and preventible homicide' (London Borough of Brent, 1985) - 
but others are so politely worded that, although the tenor of their views is apparent, there is 
no simple quotation to extract. I have classified reports as not critical of statutory social 
workers only when there is a clear statement to that effect, such as: 'we consider that high 
standards of professional care and skill were demonstrated by those who worked with the 
baby and his family (Cheshire, 1982), 'all concerned implemented policies properly and acted 
reasonably' (Cambridgeshire County Council, 1982), or the more subdued conclusion that no 
professional judgements were made 'carelessly or recklessly' (Salop County Council, 1973.) 
 To compare critical and non-critical reports, it proved illuminating to classify the 
reports further according to the stage of social work intervention at which the child's death 
occurred.The first category consists of cases where social workers had received referrals 
alleging actual or risk of abuse but had concluded that the child was not in danger. The 
second group comprises reports where some degree of risk to the child was identified but 
there was insufficient evidence to justify removing the child.The third stage of social work 
intervention examined by inquiries is after children have been received into care because of 
abuse and the decision is made to send them home on trial.The final group involves foster 
and adoptive families who abused the children in their care. The Cleveland and Orkney 
reports are discussed separately since they deal with groups of cases not an individual one. 
 The first stage - of preliminary investigation - applied to twelve reports. All these 
reports were critical of professionals.  Social workers themselves were not criticised in three 
cases since their misjudgement arose from the failure of other professionals to give them 
significant information. In these three cases, the main agency involved was faulted - in one 
case the NSPCC, in another the general practitioner, and, in the third, the hospital paediatric 
unit.  
 All the cases show a failure either to collect all the relevant, available information or 
to put the known pieces of the jigsaw together and see the picture of abuse. Reuben Carthy's 
doctor saw injuries that he believed were due to abuse but he did not judge them serious and 
failed to tell anyone. If his information had been added to other professionals' worries about 
the family, the level of concern would have risen sharply and Reuben would probably have 
been seen to be at considerable risk (Nottinghamshire, 1985). 
 Twelve reports fell into the second category where some risk had been identified but 
it had been deemed insufficient to warrant the child's removal. In these cases, social workers 
were monitoring the family and offering some help to those parents who were cooperative. 
This type of case can be very stressful to the workers involved who feel concern for the 
child's safety but have to work within their legal powers and make difficult judgements about 
the level of risk.The complexity of this work is recognised by the inquiries which only 
faulted social workers in three cases (25%). One inquiry produced two reports with 
conflicting judgements. Of the other eight, one was critical of the health visitors  and another 
concluded that poor resources prevented professionals, particularly social workers, from 
providing an adequate service. Six reports (50%) however concluded that no-one was to 
blame; the child's death had not been predictable from the available evidence and workers 
had investigated and monitored the families well so that they were making their judgements 
on a reasonable body of evidence. 
 Thirteen reports dealt with cases where a child was home on trial after being in care 
because of abuse. Eight of these reports were critical of social workers' monitoring of the 
family. Of the other five, two criticised the courts for, in one case, refusing and, in another, 
revoking a care order despite a good case being put by the Social Services Department. In 
one early case the Children's Department had only a marginal role since most of the work 
 
 
was done by the NSPCC and the paediatric unit. Two reports faulted no-one acknowledging 
that the decision to return the child had been reasonable on the evidence available at the time 
and only with hindsight can we see that it was disastrously wrong. 
 Of the six reports dealing with foster or adoptive families, half were critical. Two of 
the three critical cases involved a private fostering arrangement, where in one case relatives 
and, in the other, neighbours offered help during a crisis to a family already known to Social 
Services. The three non-critical reports concerned one adoptive family and two local 
authority foster homes. In each case, they concluded that the social work assessments of the 
families' suitability had been carried out well and the placements had been reasonably 
supervised.    
 Inquiry reports illustrate the fallibility of professionals in child protection work. In all 
the cases the child was not adequately protected from harm so professionals' judgements 
were clearly wrong. But the reports also demonstrate the important distinction between 
avoidable and unavoidable mistakes. Some mistakes involve a judgement or decision that is 
later shown to be wrong but that were reasonable given the information at the time it was 
made. Social workers were criticised for avoidable mistakes when they failed to make 
reasonable efforts to collect information - like the social worker who failed to read the file 
and so did not notice that the children were on the at risk register - or to interpret the 
evidence they had - as in the case where known abuse to an elder sibling was ignored when 
assessing current risk. 
 
Changing your mind 
 
 Since judgements in child protection work have to be made on the basis of imperfect 
knowledge, later developments in a case will often require a review and a revision of one's 
views. But the most striking lesson to be learned from inquiry reports, whether critical or not, 
is how resistant people are to altering their beliefs. Inquiry reports repeatedly comment on the 
workers' reluctance to alter their views: 'the overall attitude that comes through to the inquiry 
is one of fixed attitudes' (Northern Regional Health Authority, 1989.) Whether suspicious or 
optimistic about a family, social workers tended to be biassed in their attitude to new 
information.  
 Social workers are not unusual in being slow to change their minds. Francis Bacon, 
the sixteenth century philosopher of science, noted that we all tend to pay more attention to 
evidence that supports our beliefs than to evidence that challenges it: 
 
the human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion (either as being the 
received opinion or as being agreeable to itself) draws all things else to 
support and agree with it.  And though there be a greater number and weight 
of instances to be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects or 
despises, or else by some distinction sets aside and rejects (1620.) 
 
 There is now a wealth of  research in psychology that endorses this view of human 
nature:  'once formulated or adopted, theories and beliefs tend to persist, despite an array of 
evidence that should invalidate or even reverse them (Nisbett and Ross, 1980, p.10). 
Kahneman (1990, p.149), summarising the research evidence, explains that: 'our beliefs 
influence the processes by which we seek out, store, and interpret relevant information'. We 
selectively remember information that endorses our beliefs (Kahneman, 1990, p.150). We 
look for evidence to confirm not disprove our views (Wason, 1960). We adopt different 
 
 
critical standards for evidence depending on whether it confirms or challenges our beliefs: 
supportive information tends to be taken at face value while potentially disconfirmatory 
evidence is subjected to highly sceptical scrutiny (Lord et al, 1979). As a consequence of all 
these biasses, there is 'the tendency to perceive more support for those beliefs than actually 
exists in the evidence at hand' Kahneman, 1990, p.149).   
 This tendency is apparent throughout the inquiry reports. To return to the jigsaw 
analogy, it is as if once the workers have decided that the underlying picture is of, say, a 
happy family they will then find it easy to notice or remember any pieces that fit this image. 
Memories of seeing the child playing happily with his mother will readily spring to mind. 
Pieces that do not fit though are less easily recollected.Times when the child was crying or 
looking scared will not come so spontaneously to mind. Even if someone reminds you of 
them, the tendency will be to think of a benign explanation - that the child was poorly at the 
time perhaps - so that they are reshaped into an acceptable form to fit the puzzle.  
 The imagery of a puzzle is valuable, I think, in highlighting the repercussions of 
doubting your current assessment. The social worker does not just face altering his or her 
belief about one item of information but has to consider changing the whole picture of the 
case. All the known evidence then needs to be reappraised and found a place in the new 
emerging picture. The human tendency to avoid critical reappraisals of their beliefs may in 
part be due to a reluctance to undertake such a challenging and arduous intellectual task. 
 Reder et al analysed thirty-five inquiry reports and, in considering how faulty 
assessments of families are achieved, identified four recurrent themes (1994, p.83). They 
found workers could mis-interpret available evidence by treating information discretely so 
that the overall pattern is not seen, making selective interpretations and not considering 
alternatives,  having pervasive belief systems, and focussing on concrete solutions at the 
expense of asessing complex relationships issues. These factors, however, do not operate 
randomly. My analysis indicates that social workers' appraisal of a family strongly influences 
the quality of investigations and assessments. 
 In the cases examined by the inquiries, social workers' actions were clearly linked to 
their existing view of the family.The extent to which information was checked, for instance, 
related to whether it supported existing views or not. Social workers tended to accept 
information unquestioningly when it fitted their current opinion. Therefore John Aukland's 
social worker who had a positive view of John accepted his benign version of his first 
daughter's death and failed to check the records that would have told him John had been 
convicted of manslaughter and sent to prison for killing his six week old baby.  Once 
optimism had set in, the social worker in the Jasmine Beckford case 'was, fatally, much too 
willing to believe everything 'her clients' (the Beckford parents) told her'  (London Borough 
of Brent, 1985.)   
 Conversely, social workers showed much more scepticism when information 
conflicted with their views. This is particularly apparent in their readiness to dismiss 
allegations of abuse from relatives and neighbours as malicious and unfounded. Maria 
Colwell's neighbours tried hard to get help for her as she led a life of drudgery, losing weight 
and looking 'listless, tired, and unkempt', but they were unsuccessful. The social worker 
accepted the parents' claim that her injuries were due to accidents and suspected that the 
neighbours' allegations stemmed not from a concern for Maria but from hostility to the 
parents (HMSO, 1974). She did not accept their claims of deterioration in Maria's health or 
check them with available sources such as the school (who had the same anxieties as the 
neighbours but did not volunteer them). 
 Conflicting evidence is often not discounted but apparently just ignored. A case 
 
 
conference on Stephanie Fox (Wandsworth, 1989) when she was home on trial was told in a 
letter from the paediatrician that injuries he had seen on Stephanie's ears and back recently 
were unlikely to be accidental. At the conference her parent denied causing them but offered 
no alternative explanation for them.They had also denied the injuries that had been the 
grounds for the care order. This time, their denial was not challenged nor alternative 
explanations sought. The injuries seem simply to have disappeared from people's awareness. 
The conclusion of the conference was optimistic and the Chairman later wrote to the parents 
saying: 'your daughters are continuing to progress steadily, and there have been no injuries to 
cause concern'.   
 New, alternative interpretations of the known information also seem to fare badly. In 
the reports, conflicting views rarely led to a productive, rational discussion of the rival 
pictures of the family. In fact conflict often appears to occur in the context of a battlefield 
rather than a debating chamber with the loser left feeling bitter and resentful, still convinced 
that his or her opinion is right but that it has not been taken seriously by the others. This is 
particularly so with relatives and neighbours who have failed to convince social workers that 
children were in danger. But even high status does not guarantee having your views listened 
to. In the case of Carly Taylor, her childminder wrote directly to the Director of Social 
Services, having failed to persuade the senior social worker that Carly was in danger. He 
examined the file and 'formed the opinion that it was fairly clearly a classic case that might 
become one of non-accidental injury' (Leicestershire County Council, 1980.) A memo was 
sent to the senior listing the risk factors and telling him to put the child on the at risk register. 
The inquiry found that this failed to change the senior's benign opinion of the family. He 
responded to the instruction in a desultory manner so that Carly's name was finally put on the 
register on the day she died. 
 If we compare the reports where social workers were criticised with the non-critical 
ones, the influence of the existing view of the family on workers' responses to new 
information or ideas is apparent. 
 In my analysis of reports, all the reports in the first group where the risk was not 
recognised are critical, (although, in three cases, not of the social workers) whereas, in the 
next group, where abuse or risk was identified, the large majority (eight out of twelve) do not 
fault the social workers. In the cases where the risk was not seen, inquiries do not criticise the 
initial judgements of social workers but their failure to test these judgements by further 
investigation and to revise their opinions when given more information. Leanne White's 
social worker responded to the first allegation from a neighbour by visiting the family to 
investigate. She then judged that there was no cause for concern. She was not faulted for this 
judgement but for rejecting further allegations from other neighbours out of hand, without 
investigating them or reviewing her opinion of the case.  
 Social workers escape censure in 75% of the cases in the second category where risk 
was identified. By definition, this means that they had a picture of the family that included 
the possibility of abuse but in the three cases where they were criticised the social workers 
directly involved with the families had taken a more optimistic line than their colleagues. In 
the cases where their concern was high so that new evidence of abuse confirmed rather than 
challenged their existing opinion, the quality of their investigations and monitoring was 
good, but it dropped in line with their concern.   
 One striking difference between the two categories is the source of referral.  In the 
first category where risk was not identified, ten of the twelve cases were initiated by relatives 
or neighbours expressing concern about the safety of the child. In the second group, all the 
referrals came from professionals - seven came from medical personnel, two from midwives, 
 
 
one from the police, one from a probation officer, and one involved a family already known 
to Social Services so that there was concern about the child's safety as soon as they knew of 
the pregnancy. Referral from a professional seems to be treated more seriously and, with an 
initial expectation that it might be true, leads more often to a thorough investigation. In the 
second category, case conferences were held in all but one case - and that was a very early 
one before the conference procedure was established. In the first group however, conferences 
were only held in three cases (two of them on siblings, not the child who later died), each 
time at the instigation of the hospital, not in response to a complaint from a member of the 
public.   
 It may be that social workers are right to place little credence in referrals from 
neighbours and relatives while having confidence in their fellow professionals. The reports 
themselves do not answer this issue since the sample is selective. We need to know how 
many referrals are received from both groups and how many of each, in the long term, are 
deemed to have been accurate. But whatever the reliability of allegations from members of 
the public, it seems that, if a referral arouses initial scepticism, social workers are ready to 
discount  it and make less efforts to investigate and check it. However, this response is 
misguided when we remember that identifying abuse and assessing risk usually requires a 
careful and extensive gathering and interpretation of information. Just as abuse can rarely be 
recognised on the basis of a single item of information so can it rarely be discounted on such 
slender grounds. One of the main aims of current guidelines in child protection work is to 
discourage social workers from resting content with their initial intuitive appraisal of a 
referral and to encourage a more thorough investigation even when their first reaction is 
sceptical. 
 A similar picture of the influence of existing opinions is found in the third group 
where the children were home on trial. In the two cases where social workers believed the 
child should be removed from their parents but had been overruled by the courts, their 
monitoring was praised by the inquiries. In all the cases where they were criticised, they had 
believed the family were making good progress and this seems to have contributed to their 
not noticing or not recognising the significance of signs of abuse. 
 In the cases involving foster and adoptive families, social workers, understandably for 
the most part, had an optimistic view of the family and a low expectation of abuse. In two of 
the three cases where social workers were criticised however, there were significant 
differences of opinion between professionals. In one case the area social worker saw no 
problems while the fostering section felt very worried about how the foster mother was 
coping. In the other, virtually everyone except the social workers thought the children were at 
risk staying with private foster parents who had served a prison sentence for ill-treating and 
neglecting their own children. 
 The lesson to take from these findings is not that social workers should always 
suspect abuse. Since these reports were all triggered by the death or serious injury of a child, 
they only refer to families that were abusers. The nature of the sample means that it reveals 
cases where social workers' positive view of the families adversely influenced their 
investigations and monitoring. Dingwall's research suggests that this type of error is, in 
general, more likely in social work than a bias against the parents. He argues that, because of 
the structural and cultural context in which child protection services operate, staff operate 
under a 'rule of optimism': 'staff are required, if possible, to think the best of parents' (1983, 
p.79.) Current beliefs about a case, however, distort and bias workers' subsequent thinking 
whether positive or negative. The Cleveland (HMSO, 1988) and Orkney (HMSO, 1992) 
reports illustrate the pervasive influence of a negative opinion of the family. In both cases, 
 
 
staff developed strong suspicions that the children were being sexually abused. The inquiries 
criticised them for subsequently acting on these suspicions without testing or reviewing them. 
The Cleveland report criticised some workers for not considering the possibility that the 
diagnosis of sexual abuse could be wrong. The diagnosis was treated as infallible, especially 
by the doctors making the diagnosis, and all other information adapted to fit this view.The 
paediatricians were criticised 'for the certainty and overconfidence with which they pursued 
the detection of sexual abuse.' In Orkney, the Social Work department 'failed to keep an open 
mind' about the allegations of abuse; 'all agencies failed to differentiate between taking the 
allegations seriously and believing them'. 
 
Time to think 
 
 Social workers have to act urgently, making assessments and decisions based on 
sketchy information. If the tragedy unfolds fast, there may be no time for checking out this 
initial appraisal and seeking further information. However, in all the cases covered by 
reports, there was sufficient time. The only instance of a child dying on the day of referral to 
the Social Services was the case of Malcolm Page, who was referred by the health visitor to 
the general practitioner and social worker because of neglect. Hospital admission was 
arranged for the following day but he died that night in an accident. His death was 
unpredictable and more time would not have produced information that made it 
predictable.The decision to delay admission to the next day was considered quite reasonable.  
 In all other cases, there were repeated allegations of abuse or evidence available to 
suggest the risk to the child. Families were known for months and, in many cases for years, 
before the child died.  In the cases where members of the public failed to convince social 
workers of the risk to the child, they made persistent efforts to do so. The shortest case was 
that of Darren Clarke (HMSO, 1979) whose happy childhood ended when his mother moved 
in with a violent boyfriend. His relatives became very anxious about him and, besides making 
strenuous efforts themselves to find his new address, in three weeks, visited and phoned the 
police (who passed the referral on to the Social Services), phoned the NSPCC four times 
(they also passed the case on to Social Services) and phoned the Social Services once. This 
final phonecall was successful in communicating their concern. The relative who made the 
call told the inquiry he deliberately exaggerated the situation and threatened to inform the 
press if no official action was taken to check the safety of Darren. This triggered a thorough 
investigation, finding the information that had been available throughout the three weeks but, 
sadly, Darren died that evening before being found.  
 The time restrictions for social workers came not from the cases but from their work 
conditions. Heavy caseloads and little supervision made it hard for social workers to reflect 
on their work and to carry out further investigations and checks.  The worker responsible for 
Kimberley Carlile's care was a newly appointed team manager who, due to staff shortages, 
had been unable to allocate the case to a social worker. He received no supervision and so no 
help in taking a more objective view of the case or examining his judgements (London 
Borough of Greenwich, 1987.)   
 A more critical approach to child protection work requires time. Time to check 
information, not just when you are highly suspicious of it, time to read files and phone other 
agencies to get more information, time for detailed supervision, but most of all time to think. 
In a management culture increasingly concerned with financial accountability, the accountant 
may be suspicious of the social worker sitting at her desk gazing into space but she may be 
doing the most valuable thing to help the family by thinking long and hard about the case and 
 
 
reappraising the evidence for her judgements and decisions. Senior management needs to 
ensure that time for thinking and supervision is valued and protected from competing 
demands. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This article is arguing, paradoxically, that, in child protection work, making mistakes 
can be a sign of good practice insofar as a recognition of one's fallibility is part of a general 
approach involving a willingness to be self-critical and to change one's mind. All social 
workers make many misjudgements because of the complexity of the work but skilled social 
workers recognise their fallibility and are open to rethinking their assessments and decisions. 
Therefore they will more often decide their previous view was misguided.   
 Both the general public and social workers need a clear understanding of the 
distinction between avoidable and unavoidable errors. The public quite rightly has high 
expectations of social workers responsible for protecting vulnerable children. People are 
understandably distressed by the deaths and the suffering some children and families endure 
and they are right to demand public inquiries to investigate whether whether any professional 
was incompetent. Inquiries that then blame social workers tend to capture the limelight and 
are reported by the media in vivid detail. But although the death of a child is proof that the 
services failed to protect him or her, it is not proof that anyone acted improperly. The 
inquiries reviewed in this article have understood this. Many have indeed been highly critical 
of social workers and other professionals but a substantial minority (42%) concluded that 
social workers' judgements, though clearly wrong with hindsight, were reasonable given the 
evidence they had at the time.   
 The main purpose of inquiries is not to allocate blame but to see if any valuable 
lessons can be drawn from the tragedy to improve services in the future. The lesson drawn in 
this article is that social workers are slow to be critical of their own assessments and 
judgements.  Therefore inaccurate judgements that were unavoidable in that they were 
reasonable on the evidence available at the time they were made become avoidable errors 
when they are not critically reviewed and revised as more information becomes available. 
The reports demonstrate the common human failing of tending to notice evidence that 
supports one's beliefs while overlooking or dismissing evidence that challenges them. When 
social workers believed the child was at risk, they displayed a good standard of investigation 
and monitoring.When they became optimistic about a family's progress, they were slower to 
notice and recognise evidence of problems that challenged their optimism.   To reduce 
errors in child protection work, social workers need to regard their opinion of a family as 
tentative and open to revision. They can feel confident that they are making 'the best' decision 
insofar as they have made reasonable efforts to collect and check the evidence on which it is 
based but they should not base their confidence on an inner conviction that they are 'right'. 
Although some errors are unavoidable in relation to our knowledge at that time, the 
knowledge base alters. As new information is found or reflection produces new ways of 
looking at the case, previous conclusions should be reexamined and sometimes revised. The 
old view is seen to be mistaken but recognising this type of error should be encouraged, a 
sign of good practice, not something to be defensive about.   
 Taking a more critical attitude to one's work is not simple. It takes time, intelligence 
and effort. Realising your first judgements are wrong can be an unpleasant experience and 
social workers need to be supported and encouraged in subjecting their work to more 
rigorous scrutiny. Changing your mind when you receive new information or when a 
 
 
supervisor suggests a new way of interpreting the evidence is not a sign of weakness but of a 
rational, intelligent approach.   
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